In the model, since we use the real dollars for all years, the approximate AIME is not adjusted. The maximum SSTE is based on Table A1 but converted to 1999 dollars for all years. 1 Everyone is assumed to be born in 1934. Hence, for example, the maximum SSTE for a dropout is based on years 1934+16 to 1934+74.
A.2.
Step 2: Calculate Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) PIA is a piecewise linear function of AIME with three bend points: PIA ¼ 0:9 Â bendpoint1 þ 0:32ðbendpoint2 À bendpoint1Þ þ 0:15 Â ðAIME-bendpoint2Þ:
The bend points are determined by the eligible year (the year that the beneficiary reaches age 62). See Table A2 for a list of bend points by year. ,612  1985  280  1,691  1986  297  1,790  1987  310  1,866  1988  319  1,922  1989  339  2,044  1990  356  2,145  1991  370  2,230  1992  387  2,333  1993  401  2,420  1994  422  2,545  1995  426  2,567  1996  437  2,635  1997  455  2,741  1998  477  2,875  1999  505  3,043  2000  531  3,202  2001  561  3,381  2002  592  3,567  2003  606  3,653  2004  612  3,689  2005  627  3,779  2006  656  3,955  2007  680  4,100  2008  711  4,288  2009  744  4,483  2010  761  4,586  2011  749  4,517  2012 767 4,624
1 Note that these caps were increased over time in nominal terms but they did not always increase in every year. When the nominal caps were fixed (e.g. 1968-71) , the real dollar caps used in the model for that period are the average over those years.
A.3.
Step 3: Calculate Benefit Deduction for Early Retirement or Credit for Delayed Retirement Everyone is eligible for the SS benefit at age 62, but the 'normal' retirement age gradually increases over time. Benefits are reduced for those who claim prior to their normal retirement age. There is a credit for those who delay claiming their benefit up to age 70 (see Table A3 ). In the simulated data, based on the 1934 cohort, the normal retirement age is 65. In the actual SS rule, benefits are also adjusted by a cost-of-living factor over time. We did not incorporate this factor as we use real dollars in all years.
Appendix B. Tax on Social Security Benefits and the Earnings Test
The Social Security earnings test and tax on Social Security Benefit are separate rules, although some people view the earnings test as a tax. The earnings test applies to beneficiaries who continue to work (after claiming benefits) and who earn above a threshold. It is refunded at a certain age that has varied over time (see below). The SS tax applies to beneficiaries whose total income net of a certain exemption exceeds a threshold.
B.1. The Social Security Earnings Test
For beneficiaries who continue to work and have earnings above a threshold, a portion of benefits may be withheld until the person reaches a certain age (which has varied over time). There are two withholding rates and two thresholds (exempt amounts). The higher rate (50%) and lower threshold apply to beneficiaries who receive benefits before reaching their normal retirement age. The lower rate (33.33%) and higher threshold apply after the beneficiaries reach their normal retirement age. The amount of benefits withheld, BW(w t h t , t, SSinc*, t B ) in (15) in the text, is calculated based on the following formula: NoET , the withheld benefit is credited back by adjusting the PIA in a way that is roughly actuarially fair. However, it is believed that many beneficiaries do not understand this rule and treat the earnings test as a tax on earnings. In our model, the parameter h in (15) captures the perceived fairness of the refund. provinc ¼ total income þ certain otherwise tax-exempt income À deduction (education, moving expenses etc) þ 50% of SS benefit:
Taxable Social Security income (tSSinc t ) is then determined by the following formula:
where the two statutory thresholds, T 1 and T 2 , are 25,000 and 34,000 for single, and 32,000 and 44,000 for married couples, respectively. In the model, we use the thresholds for singles. Note that, unlike the PIA bend points, the thresholds T 1 and T 2 are not indexed for inflation. Therefore, it is expected that more people will be affected by these thresholds over time.
Appendix C. Probability of Receiving a Private Pension
We use the data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to estimate the probability of receiving a private pension (16). The sample includes male respondents aged 55-90 in the 1992-2010 waves. The indicator of whether the respondent receives a pension is derived from whether the respondent reported positive pension or annuity income. Because the HRS collected data every 2 years, the lagged pension variable is derived from the previous wave data (i.e. we assume that dpen tÀ1 = dpen tÀ2 ). The same sample is used to estimate the average annual pension income for each education group. The figures are converted to 1999 dollars. Conditional on reporting pension income, average annual pensions are $8,922, $14,887 and $23,565 for dropout, high school and college types. The sample includes males with positive total income and tax filing status as single. We use 2005-6 data because some of tax variables are only available from 2005 onwards. The regression provides a good fit to the CPS data (R 2 = 0.936) ( Figure E1 ). 
H U M A N C A P I T A L A N D T H E E X T E N S I V E M A R G I N

Appendix F. Calculation of Compensation for Tax Changes
In experiments with a permanent compensated tax change at t 0 , we assume that the change is a surprise at t 0 but the agent anticipates the new tax regime to last until T. Between period t 0 and T, the agent also knows he will receive an exogenous (non-taxable) compensation amount, x. Let S t denote a set of state variables where S t = {A t , k t , AIME tÀ1 , p t-1 , dpen tÀ1 , ss tÀ1 , age ss }. The state variables vary across t (see Section 3 in the paper for more details).
In all experiments, we first simulate behaviour under the baseline situation in two steps:
(i) Use backward induction to solve the optimisation problem from T: t 0 (e) under the baseline situation (tax 0 ) and save EV(S t | tax 0 ) for each grid point. (ii) Simulatethebehaviourfromt 0 (e)toTgiventhe initialconditionA 0 , k 0 , p 0 fori = 1, . . ., N for this baseline situation where N is the number of simulated workers at t 0 (e).
To simulate the effect of a compensated tax change, we next:
(iii) Calculate the annual compensation amount, x, for a permanent tax change at t 0 using information from step (ii) (see details below). x is calculated for each education group.
Resolve the optimisation problem (similar to step i) except now an agent faces a new tax scheme and receives an exogenous (non-taxable) income amount, x, from T: t 0 . The EV ðS t jtax 1 ; xÞ for all grid points are saved.
Simulate the behaviour from t 0 (e) to T given the initial condition A 0 , k 0 , p 0 for all i under the new tax regime. For a surprise tax change, the agents use EV(S t | tax 0 )} in their optimisation from t 0 ðeÞ : t 0 À 1: Once at t 0 , they expect the new tax regime to be permanent, and they use EV(S t | tax 1 , x)} in their optimisation. They also receive the compensation, x, from t 0 onward.
Calculation of compensated income (based on the Slutsky approach) (a) From step (ii), save optimal hours worked fh Ã it ð:jtax 0 Þg)} and the total tax payment, taxðw it h Ã it ; :jtax 0 Þ: The tax payment depends on labour income and other sources of income (see (21) in the paper). (b) Calculate the tax payment under the new tax situation, holding hours of work fixed at baseline levels: taxðw it h Ã it ; :jtax 1 Þ: (c) Calculate year-by-year income differences between the baseline and the new tax regime (with hours of work held fixed). We denote these differences by D it , where:
(d) In order to avoid having the compensation stream become a new person-specific state variable (which would greatly slow down solution of the DP problem), we find an average compensation stream that is common to all agents (conditional on their education). We found that tailoring the compensation to observed income streams did not make much difference, presumably because most heterogeneity of income (within type) is unpredictable. To proceed, for each year t, we calculate the average income differences for people who are alive in that period:
where N t is the number of people alive at t. (e) Calculate the present value of E i [D t ], discounted to the period of the tax change t 0 :
Calculate the expected present value of the total compensation from t 0 to T, taking into account the survival probabilities:
where s t 0 þt ¼ s t 0 þtjt . . .s t 0 þtjtþtÀ1 is the probability of surviving to t 0 + t. (g) Construct a constant stream of compensation that has the same present value as E[PV],
i.e., solve for x in:
Rearranging yields:
The compensations (x) for the flat tax rate experiment when implemented at t = t 0 (e) are $671, $1,209, $2,041 for the dropout, HS and college groups, respectively. For the experiment where we changed the intercept (slope) of the tax function, the x are $423 ($451), $1,215 ($1,199) and $2,314 ($2,794) for the dropout, HS and college groups, respectively.
The numerator is calculated in a usual way: 
G.1.2. Approach 2
A second approach is to calculate the average of the factor s/(1 À s) directly as:
gives Marshallian elasticities of 0.56, 0.38 and 0.34 for dropout, high school and college workers, and Hicks elasticities of 1.12, 0.78 and 0.83 respectively.
G.1.3. Approach 3
An alternative approach is to calculate the elasticity for each person and each period, and then average over people and time. For each person, we still need to calculate his average tax rate because tax rates also vary across t. For instance:
A na€ ıve application of this approach will not work because some people do not work in some periods (causing any percentage changes in hours from zero to positive to be infinite).
Instead, we consider calculating aggregate elasticities by each age and then taking a weighted average by hours at the baseline situation for the lifetime elasticity: Notice that elasticities calculated using the three methods are very similar.
G.2. Changes in the Tax Function Slope
For a change in the slope, b 0 , the expression %D(1 À s) = Às/(1 À s) 9 %Ds still holds. Here, however, %Ds is no longer a constant. If we increase the slope to b 1 , s i,t is increased proportionally more for people with higher taxable income:
(G.5)
We can consider three approaches to calculate %(1 À s), similar to the case of changing the intercept, but incorporating the fact that %Ds varies across i and t.
G.2.1. Approach 1 %Dð1 À sÞ ¼ Às=ð1 À sÞ Â %Ds:
The terms s and ð1 À sÞ are given in (G.2), and:
%Ds ¼ This approach gives Marshallian elasticities of 0.60, 0.46 and 0.43 for dropout, high school and college workers and Hicks elasticities of 1.24, 0.87 and 0.99 respectively.
Notice again that elasticities calculated using the three methods are very similar.
